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Faculty and Deans

G lenn E. Coven is a Professo r o f Law at the
Marsha ll -Wythe Schoo l o f Law, Co llege of William
and Mary.
In this artic le, Coven points out that the Subc hapte r S provision of the Code prescribes very detailed
procedura l rules that produce unintended resu lts
from time to time. The Interna l Revenue Service has
responded in some instances by a very liberal
ru ling po licy relieving the hardsh ip. Th is te nds to
make the rea l law of Subchapter S d ifferent from
the apparent law. He thinks that the statutory restric tions are attributable to the re latively low tax cost of
moving in and out of Subchapter S for corporati ons
that have accumulated earnings. In an S co rporati on, income earned by prior accumulated pro fi ts
can escape the corporate tax although it has not
previously been subjec ted to shareholder tax. He
proposes th at the d efinition of an S corporation be
greatly libera lized for corporations lacking ea rn ings
and profits.
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MAKING SUBCHAPTER S WORK
by Glenn E. Coven

expens ive-and dangerous-than the use of either partnerships or regu lar corporatio ns.
If the maxi mum rate of tax app li cab le to ind ividua l
taxpayers is reduced in accordance with the current
leg islative proposals, t he popularity of the recent ly renamed S corporation shou ld increase signif icantly. Indeed, if the maximum ind ividual rate is reduced relative
to the max imum corporate rate as proposed in the Senate,' the use of S corporat ions undoubted ly wi ll increase
dramaticall y. This expanded use of S corporations by
taxpayers whose tax advisors lack experience with Subchapter S enha nces the impo rtance of rationalizing the
taxation of this form of investment vehic le.

A. An Un finished Revision
Afte r nearly a quarter of a century of strugg ling with
the consequences of the orig ina l version of Subchapter
S, in 1982 the Congress enacted the Subchapter S
Revi sion Act.2 In an effort to elim inate the absurd inequitie s that permeated that first attempt to extend conduit
taxation to incorporated sma ll businesses, the system for
tax ing income derived by an S corporation , and distribut ions from such a corporat ion , was thorough ly revi sed .
While those prov isions are far from perfected , the solutions contained in the Revision Act greatly rationalized
the substant ive prov isions of Subchapter S.
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Subchap te r S of the Internal Revenue Code continues
to illu strate the enormous gu lf that too often exists between a good , simp le idea and its statutory express ion.
The provision wa s design ed to permit the incorporation
of small businesses without subject ing the ir owners to
the burden of doub le taxa t ion-or , more accurate ly , to
the need to engage in soph ist icated tax p lan n ing to avo id
that tax . Subchapter S, however, has never fulf ill ed that
promise . The c ombinat ion of hi gh ly restrict ive def init iona l
limitations, exacting procedura l requirem ents, and defective su bstantive prov isions has caused the use of the
Subch apter S c o rporation to be far more co m p lex and

TA X NOTES , July 21, 1986

Congress ' clear intention wa s to make Subchapter S 'user friendly.'

The definitional and procedural requirement s of Subchapter S, however, were little changed in 1982. Perhaps
because those features of Subc hapte r S had been repeatedly amended in prior years and their most egregious
faults eliminated," the 1982 rev ision addressed the substant ive prov isions almost exc lusive ly. As a re su lt, eligi -

' See Joi nt Committee on Ta xat io n, Summ ary of the Tax
Refo rm Provisions in H.R. 3838 as O rdered Repo rted by the
Se nate Co mmittee on Finance, May 12, 1986, reprinted in Tax
Notes , May 19,1986, p. 699 .
2Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669.
' For a brief history of the evolution of these provisi o ns, see
Coven and Hess, The Subchapter Rev isio ns Act : An Analysis
and App ra isal, 50 Tenn . L. Rev. 569 (1 983 ).
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that suc h a tru st can be a shareho lder for 60 days but
on ly if it receives the S co rp orati o n stock pursuant t o a
will. In that event , the trust is a rea l shareho lder of the
co rp o ration for all purposes for that brief period . But
what if the stock is retain ed beyond 60 days? If th e
retention proceeds from ig norance, at least , it may produce an inadvertent terminat ion in which event the t ru st
may still be recog nized as a shareho ld er for a period o f
seve ral month s, or perhaps more. Or, wh at if th e t ru st
acqui red its stock in some ot her man ner? Aga in, inadve rtent termination reli ef may be ava il ab le. For in come
repo rting purposes, during this undefined period the
trust wi ll be treated as a true shareho lder. For other
purposes, such as co nsent ing to a revocat ion of the
elect ion, its statu s is unresolved .

The dichotomy between the 'rea l' law of Subchapter S and the law as it appears from the
Code is substantial and inc reasing.

Even if the transfer to the trust is qu ite de liberate, the
trust may non et heless sti ll be treated as a permissib le
shareho lder- for at least so me purposes. Thus, for perhaps one or two month s, suc h a trans itory tru st might be
" ignored ." Wh ethe r such an ignored trust mu st rep ort income or can consent to elect ion s is wholly unreso lved . It
does appear , however, that an ignored tru st may own
stock on the day the election is f il ed w ithout destroy ing
the va lid ity of the elect ion .
However, if this deliberate trust owned stoc k on th e day
th e elect io n was fi led and the ho ld ing persisted for more
than a trans itory period, it w ill not be reco gnized as a
shareho lder and the S elect ion wil l not be effectiveunl ess , of cou rse, the trust meets th e requirements for a
qua li f ied Subc hapter S tru st . In that eve nt, the f aulty
elect io n will be treated as a termin at ion and th e trust ca n
be recognized as a shareho lder.
These impropriet ies under Subchapter S are not attributable to th e Se rvi ce's having rul ed inappropriately but
rath er to th e inh erently incon sistent def in itiona l and
procedural prov isio ns that Co ngress inserted into Subchapter S. Th e rea so ning of these private ru ling s is
dub ious but th e resu lts obtained are entirely cons iste nt
with soun d tax po li cy. Congress left th e Interna l Revenu e
Serv ice with the task of reco nci ling a generally restrict ive
statuto ry framework with t he liberalizing amendm ents
added in 1982. It is hardly unreaso nabl e for the Se rv ice to
co nclud e that it co uld not grant reli ef to acc id ental
ter minati o ns of election s but deny relief to fau lty elect ion s
that involved ind istingui shab le er ro rs.
Th e Se rvi ce ca nn ot succeed in sat isfacto ri ly reco nciling
these co ntrad icto ry themes and the effort to do so wi ll
inevitab ly be cou nte rproductive to the ove rall objective of
minimizing the co mpl exity and obscurity of Subchapter
S. The conseq uences of this liberali zing series of priv ate
rulin gs has been to lea ve the state of the law in a far
diffe rent po st ure from what mi ght be supposed from a
reading of th e highly restrictive provisions of the Code .
At the moment, the ve ry ex istence of th ese libera lizin g
rul es is known on ly to the relat ively few pract it ioners t hat
follow the private rulin gs. Even when regu latio ns are
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iss ued , they are un lik ely to e mbody all of the remed ial
po licies ref lecte d in the current ru lings . As suggested
above, the prec ise sco pe o f the transitory shareholder
ru le is lik ely to rem ain unclear for decades .
Even if the rul es and procedures unde r Subchapte r S
are ultimate ly estab li shed , tho se rules wil l necess aril y be
interna lly in c on sistent in bot h spirit and result. Since
so me stat uto ry provision s cannot be modified, inflex ible
and rest rictive ru les w ill co-ex ist w ith th e broad ly remedial. As a res u lt , it wi ll be d ifficult for pract itioners to
obtain a " fee l" for the provisions of Subchapter S . Moreover, the substantive result of these rul es will appear, and
oft en may be, unf air as in stance s of sweep ing re li ef
co nt rast with o ppress ive res ults reac hed in seeming ly
simi lar c ircu msta nces. An d finally, the attempt to reconc il e in cons istent rul es cannot avoid produc ing complex
and d iff ic ult to comprehend regu latory p rovis ions . T hus ,
the inc idence of taxpaye r error wi ll remain hi gh notwithsta nding the Service's atte mpt to proceed as f lexibly as a
broad construction of the Code permits .
For the se reason s, it is not sat isfactory to attempt to
rat iona lize the defi nitiona l and procedura l prov isio ns of
Subc hapte r S through the rulings and regulations process . As rece nt ruling s illustrate, considerab le effort will
be required to reco nci le the se provis ions . U ndoubtedly,
eve n greate r effort w il l be requ ired to prod uce ratio n al
and cons iste nt regu lation s. That effort wo u ld be better
spe nt in revising the Code prov isions themselves by
eli min at ing the oppress ive remnants of the orig inal leg islati o n and cons iste ntly extending th e phi losophy of t he
1982 amendm ents. Wh at is required to permit Subchapter
S to fulfill its promise is a co mprehensive rev ision of t he
stat utory prov isions them se lves .

The reasoning of these private rulings is dubious, but the results obtained are entirely
consistent with sound tax policy.

2. The Effective Date of the Electi on: the Price of
St inginess. Th e f law in the provisions of Subchapter S
t hat g ove rn the effecti ve date of the election is best
und erstood, oddly enough , by exam ining the provis ions
that contro l the effective date of the term ination of
Subch apte r S elect ion s. Und er the ru les in effect pr ior to
1982, the termination of a Subchapter S election cou ld
occ ur on ly as of th e e nd o f a taxab le year . Moreover, if
th e terminat ion w ere by a vo luntary revocation, the terminat ion co uld on ly be prospective' 6 That li m itation was
unsatisfactory to many S co rporation shareholders who
discovered during a taxab le yea r th at chang ing circumsta nces had left the ir elect ion unattractive .
Fo rtun ate ly, a so lution was at hand . If th e elect ion
terminated involuntarily-because the cor poratio n no
longer met the definitional requirements for electing S
stat us-the te rmin at io n was retroactive to the b eg inning
of the taxab le year . Th e ot her sid e of st rict defin itional
requirements was t hat it was terribly simple to fail th e

!6Fo rm er I. R.C. sect io n 1372(e)(2) .
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defi ni t io na l test s by d es ign . As a res u lt , th e stand ard
pro cedure fo r te rm inat ing an unwanted S electi o n wa s to
tran sfer sto ck in t he co rp orat io n to an impermi ss ibl e
sha re ho ld e r suc h as t he co rp o rate att o rn ey's p rofess io na l
co r po rat ion .
Th at into le rab ly r id ic u lo us statut o ry patte rn w as eli minat ed in th e Revision Ac t thro ug h th e adm irab ly simpl e
techniqu e of d ispe nsin g w it h t he requirem ent of yea r-end
te rm inati o ns . Und e r c u rrent law , in vo luntary term inati o ns
are effect ive on th e day th at th e d isqu alify in g event
o c c urs,17 a nd vo lu ntary te rmin at io ns m ay be effectiv e o n
any pros pect ive d ay spec if ied by t he share ho lde rs. ' s As a
res ul t , S c orpo rati o ns no lo ng e r have th e ab il ity to ret roac t ive ly te rmin ate t he ir statu s a nd th eir shareho ld ers are
no lo nge r req ui red t o e ngage in mea nin g les s t ransfe rs to
avo id th e d ef erra l o f t heir revocat io n to th e e nd of th e
yea r.

S corporations no longer have the ability to
retroactively terminate their status.

Th at su bsta nt ial improve m ent in th e ration a li ty of th e
proce dures gove rnin g th e term inat io n of S elect ion s was
ach ieved at onl y a min im a l in c rease in t he c omp lex ity of
th e substant ive p rov isio ns o f S ubc hapter S. Perm itting
m id - yea r te rm inat ion s req u ired that th e inc om e fo r th e
yea r o f termin atio n be all ocated betwee n th e sho rt period s
prece din g and f o ll o win g th e t erm inati o n . ' 9 Suc h an all oca ti o n, ho w eve r, mu st a lso be m ade in any yea r in w h ic h
sto c k in an S co rp o rat io n is transfe rred to ensure th at th e
tran sfe ror and t ransfe ree are appro pri ately taxe d . Thu s
t he need for an alloca ti o n in th e y ea r of term ination d id
not in ject a nove l requ ire me nt into th e ta xat io n of S
co rporat ion s. M o reover, th e adm in istrat ive burd e n of
ma k ing inc om e all ocati o ns was lesse ned by pe rmittin g
t he in co m e f o r t he te rmin at io n yea r to be pro rated ove r
t he e nt ire y ea r.20 Th e ex pe nse and inc onveni enc e o f an
in te r im c los in g of t he books t hu s c ou ld be avo ided if th e
parties so des ired .
Unfo rtun ate ly, th e ru les gove rn ing the ma k ing of elec t io ns w ere not simi la rl y rat ion ali zed . Rath e r, the requ ireme n t of th e o r ig in al S u bc hapte r S that election s becom e
effec t ive on ly at th e beg innin g of a tax ab le yea r w as
retained. 21 W hi le th at li mitati o n m ay appea r harm less
en o ugh , alth o ug h nee d less ly rest r ict ive, in fad it c on tri b utes to a surprising deg ree to th e excess ive ly tec hn ica l
and slig ht ly irrat io na l nat ure of S ubc hapter S.
(a) S ince th e d efin it ion al req uireme nts for electing
Su bc ha pte r S stat us re m ain t ig ht ly def ined and t he proced ura l require m ents hi g h ly tec hn ica l, it co nt inu es to be
far too easy to m ake an inva lid e lect io n. A nd, beca use th e
elect ion ca n be eff ect ive o n ly as of t he be ginnin g of t he
taxab le y ear, t he cos t o f t hat fa ilure ca n be excess ively

" !.R.C. sect ion 1362(d )( 2)( B).
,s !. RC . secti on 1362(d )( 1)( O).
" I.R.C . section 1362( e).
,o !. R.C. section 1362(e)(2) .
" !.R .C. section 1362(c ).
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great: th e loss of Su bc hapte r S statu s for an entire ye ar .
As a res ult, a d isp rop ort ion ate impo rta nce att ac hes to
c om p li ance w ith a long se ries of hi g h ly tec hni ca l requ ire ments. 22

Enormous stress is placed upon the definitions
contained in these procedural rules.

Beca use tax paye rs have o nl y o ne op po rtunit y in a y ear
to elec t Sub chapte r S statu s, eno rm o us stress is placed
upon th e defin iti o ns co ntain ed in th ese proced ural ru les.
Q uite mea ning less qu estion s, suc h as th e day on w hic h a
co rporat ion is d ee med to f irst have shareho lde rs und er
state law,23 ass um e undu e signi fica nce. Two q uite co nfl ictin g co nse qu e nces have resu lted f ro m t he importance
attac hed to th ese tec hni ca l requirements. Most obv io usly,
many taxpay ers have bee n deni ed Subc hapte r S statu s
for t heir co rp orat ions fo r an entire yea r, o r mo re, beca use
of hi g h ly tec hni ca l d efects in th e electio n p rocess . Th ose
res ults, w hi le pe rh aps un avo id able und er t he tech ni ca l
langu age of th e statute, are neve rth eless in co nsisten t
w ith th e more ge neral co ng ress io nal des ire to e lim inate
need less "t ra ps for t he un wa ry" in th e ad min ist rat io n of
Subc hapte r S.
On th e oth er hand, beca use t hese tec hni ca lly inva lid
e lect ion s a re c lea rly in co mp atibl e wit h so und ta x po li cy ,
th e Se rvi ce has freq uent ly so ugh t t o avo id t hose res ul ts
thro ug h unu sua ll y libe ral co nstru ct ion s of th e stat utory
require me nts. As described above, pr ivate rulin gs have
bee n iss ued in wh ic h im pe rmi ss ib le shareho lde rs have
bee n ign o red beca use th ey we re " transito ry " and in
w hi c h a QSST t ru st was treated as a pe rmitted sha rehol de r eve n t hough th e be nefi c iary had failed to elec t
that statu s.
If th e Co ng ress had exte nd ed to th e makin g of S
elect io ns th e sa me f lex ib ility t hat it extend ed to the

2' For a sa mp li ng of th e ancill ary ru les that co mpli cate com pliance with the provisions that govern th e time in which elections
mu st be fi led, th e foll ow in g exa mples may su ff ice . Th e Code
permits th e electi on to be made prospecti vely or durin g th e first
two and one- half month s of th e yea r for whi ch it is to be
effective. However, th e Code appears to requ ire that the co rporation meet the definit ional requirements on th e day that it fil es
its electi on eve n th ough the elect ion is not to beco me effective
fo r severa l monlil s. Mo reove r, if the co rpo rat ion is elect in g
du rin g the two and one-half month grace peri od, those requireme nts mu st be met during the po rtion of the yea r preced in g the
electi on and all shareholders durin g that pre-elect ion peri od
must conse nt to the election eve n if they no longer own any
stock on the day the elect ion is made . If one of th e shareholders
is a qu alified Subc hapte r S tru st, the benefi ciary of the tru st
mu st not onl y co nsent to the electi on but must also elect QSST
statu s for his tru st. all within th e grace pe riod. And the corporati on must use th e ca lenda r year or a yea r having a bus iness
purpose or its election wi ll not be va lid.
" The grace period for electing beg in s to run whe n th e co rporat ion first has assets, shareholde rs, or beg ins bu sin ess. Rev .
Rul. 72-257 , 1972-1 C.B. 270, held th at the period began to run
on the date of in co rporation because under state law , in th e
abse nce of actua l stock holders, th e subscri be rs to stock were
treated as shareholders.
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revok ing of elections, the st re ss on the statutory definition s wou ld have bee n avoided and th e res ult ing distortion
of the statu tory language unn ecessa ry . If, for example,
the ex iste nce of a co rporat e shareho lder on the first day
of a taxable year only mea nt that the elec tion would
become eff ect ive on the fo ll ow ing day, it p lain ly wou ld be
unn ecessa ry to evo lve rules permitting and defining transitory shareho lde rs .
Such a rul e migh t permit furth er si mpl ifi ca tion s. More
f lex ibl e electio ns would make it unnecessa ry to permit
retroactive election s during a grace period. Th e series of
ru les defin ing the grace period and th e effect of an inva lid
retroact ive electio n during the grace period co uld be
eliminated .
(b) Subchapter S does not co nta in any c o ncep t of
cha ng e of corpo rate ownership. Rath er , the traditional
co ncep t of the separate entity of the corpo ration prevail s.
If a ll of th e stock of a corporation is purc hased in the
midd le of a year, the en tirely new shareho lder group is no
more able to elect under Subchapter S prior to the e nd of
the year than were th e se lle rs. T hat resul t is p lain ly
inappro priate.

There is no obvious reason why a corporation
should be permitted to make a one-day election
for the purpose of passing an extraordinary
loss through to its shareholders.

The broader picture, however, is even worse for in th is
area, too, the Serv ice has attempted to avo id harsh
res ults through libe ral ru lings when so me bas is for that
flexibility wa s prese nted . And , as before , that liberality
ha s created a less than rat iona l pattern of sometimes
harsh , so metim es li bera l rul es . If the purchasi ng shareho lders have th e good fortun e to purchase t he stoc k of a
co rporation from a corporat ion that had bee n fi ling a
consol idated ret urn, th e S election may be mad e imm ediately. It see ms that under the consol idated ret urn
regu lations, th e short period commencing w ith the deconso lidat ion of a subs idiary is treated as a se parate taxab le
year.24 For that h igh ly tec hn ica l reason, the Se rvi ce ha s
repeat edly ru led that such an acqu ired corporation may
fi le a S elect ion with in the grace pe riod that beg ins w ith
the first day of that short year.25
Needless, perhap s, to obse rve, the ability to e lect under
S ubchapte r S shou ld not turn on the fortu ity of a stock
purchase from a conso lidated group . A more f lexible
elect ion procedure wou ld avoid that d isco ntinuity.
(c) In one res pec t, th e f lex ib ili ty of the revocat ion ru le
is to o libe ral. Th e re is no obvious rea so n why a corporation should be permitted to make a one-day e lection for
the purpose of pass ing an extraord ina ry loss through to
its shareho lders. A more f lexib le election procedure wou ld
aggravate that possibi li ty for it would bec ome easier for a
corpora t ion to elect S treatment for the per iod of t i me in
which it was accomp lish ing a fu ll or partial liquidation of
its assets.

''' Reg s. sec t ion 1.1S02-7 6(d ).
" E.g ., PLR 8443039 (Ju l. 23,1984) .
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Rega rd less of whether the e lection or the revocatio n
occurs in mid-year, S ubch apte r S e lections by prev io usly
non e lect ing, o r "C" corporat ions, for a pe riod shorter
than, sa y , one year shou ld not be perm itted . Wh il e that
requir e m ent could be impo sed in a variety of ways , it
w ou ld see m appropriate to simp ly bar Subc hapte r S
t rea tm e nt for any period t o a corporat io n that had ever
been a no ne lect ing corporation if any form of term in ation
of S status occurs within a prescribed period o f t ime
fo llow ing the elect ion .
3. The Qualified Subchapte r S Tru st: The Futility o f
Stinginess. Th is third exa mpl e of the te nsio n bet wee n
rigidi ty and f lex ib ility in the procedura l requ ireme nts o f
S ub c hapte r S il lust ra tes a somewhat different point. For
better or worse, Subcrlapter S is a part o f o u r Inte rn al
Reve nue Code. The Congress cannot simu ltaneously
make Subc hapter S useful an d in su late it from the carnival
of tax plann ing that occurs eve ry w here e lse .
Th e m ost libe ra l prov isio n in the def init io n of a small
business corporatio n is the one permitti ng qualified Subchapter S tru sts t o be shareho lders. But the definition of
a QSST is quite narrow ly def ined .26 The entire eco nomic
interest in suc h a trust must belong to a single beneficiary
for th e duration of the be nefic iary's life or the sho rter
term of the trust. The ben eficiary's income interest cannot
earli e r terminate and any d istributions of income or
corpu s must be t o that benef iciary. Fina ll y, all o f the
f iduci ary acco unting income of the t rust must be cu r rently
distributed, or required to be d istributed, to that benefic iary.
It is thu s quite c lea r that if a shareho lder o f an S co r poration placed some of his stock ina trust for the benefit of
a minor chi ld, the trust wou ld not be a q ua lifi ed Subchapter S tru st if the term s o f t he trust were as fo ll ows:
the trust is to last for 11 y ea rs ; all of the trus t income is to
be accumulated; the ind epend e nt trustee may make co rpu s di stributions to the sister of the income be nef ici ary;
and, upon the termination of the trust, all of its assets,
inc lud ing th e accumu lated in come, wou ld revert to th e
c reator o f th e tru st. Neverth e less, suc h a trust co u Id be a
permissib le shareholder of an S co rporation .

Grantor trusts are also permissible shareholders of S corporations.

Grantor trusts are also permiss ib le share holders of S
corporat ions, provided that a ll of the trust is treate d
under th e C liffo rd provis ions as owned by " an ind ividua l. "
That permission extends to section 678 trusts . Under that
sec t ion, one other than the c reator of the t r ust may be
treated as the owner of the trust if he has the u n ilatera l
powe r to vest the income (or the co rpus) of the trust in
h imse lf . If s uch a power ex ists over a ll of t he income of
th e tru st , section 678 treats the power ho lde r as the
own e r of the e ntire trust for the purpose of taxi ng him on
the tr ust income- notwithstandi ng that the co r pus of the
trust may be distributed to another or may reve rt to the
creator of the trust.

'· I.R.C . section 136 1 (d)( 3) .

T AX N OTES, July 21,1986

SPECIAL REPO RT

Notw it hsta nding this treatment of the power ho lde r as
t he ow ner of t he ent ire trust for t hese income tax p u rposes, it mi ght be argued that the trust described above
neve rthe less was not a perm issib le sharehol der of an S
co rporatio n because t he benef iciary did not in fact ow n
t he enti re t rust w ith in the mean ing o f sect io n 1361 (c)
(2)(A)( i). T hat sect ion, however, o nl y req ui res that the
trust be t reated as owned by a sing le ind ivid ual and t hat
sect io n 678 does. Accord ing ly , t he Se rvice has ru led
privately that a short term sect ion 678 trust may be a
pe rmiss ib le share ho lder of an S corporat io n.27
O f course, to obta in sect ion 678 treatme nt, the be nef iciary must have the power to withdraw all of t he income
of the trust cu rrent ly. Bu t the " income" that th e power
ho lde r has t he ri g ht to withdraw can on ly be the " income"
that the trust ha s ava il ab le to d istr ibu te . If the on ly asset
of the trust is stock in an S corporat io n, that " income"
ca n o nl y extend to d istribut ions from the corpora tionand not to the taxab le income of the S corporat ion that is
all ocab le to the trus t. Thus, if the S corporat ion does not
make any d istributions, t here w ill be nothing for the
power ho lder to w it hd raw upon the annua l exerc ise of h is
right. And, if the ba lance of the stock is owned indiv idua ll y
by the creator of the trust or members of his fam il y , the
mak ing or not of distribu t ions can be ent ire ly contro ll ed.
As a result, it is ent ire ly poss ible to g ive t he income
benef iciary a right to dema nd the d istribut ion of all t rust
income but to ensure t hat no econom ic benef it w ill eve r
be obta ined by t he benef ic iary. Upon the conclus ion of
t he trust term, the corpus of the tr ust, stock in t he S
corporat ion- includ ing t he increase in va lue that has
bee n taxed to the income benefi ciary of the trust u nde r
sect io n 678-w ill revert to the creator.

The attempt to isolate it from tax planning has
left Subchapter S unusable in too many legitimate contexts.

If suc h a short te rm t rust is in fact a pe rmi ssib le shareho lder o f an S corporat io n, t here wi ll be few instances in
whic h it w ill be necessary to use the tight ly restricted
qua lif ied Subchapter S trust. The section 678 trust is a far
mo re f lex ib le veh ic le. That observat ion brings us to the
point of t his example.
In eith er its present form or the modest ly simp lifi ed
vers ion cur rent ly being cons idered in Cong ress , t he
Code is an enormous ly comp li cated body of law that in
large measure is des igned to encourage comp lex tax
plann ing . Subchapter S, w ith its techn ica l and elaborate
procedura l requ irement s, is very muc h a part of th at
Code. If S corpo rat ions are to be made usab le by a
sign if icant number of taxpayers, Subchapter S must
interact w ith other p rov isions of the Code and t hat
i nteract io n w ill resu lt in dev ices that man i pu late tax
liab ili ty.
T he attempt to sa ni t ize Subchapter S, to iso late it from
t he tax p lan n ing that surrounds every other aspect of t he
tax laws, has left Subchapter S unusab le in too ma ny

" PLR 8425067 (Ma r. 20, 1984).
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leg it imate contexts. O n t he other ha nd, t he attempt has
not been successful. Even w ith a high ly rest ri ctive defin ition of smal l bus iness corporat ions, aven ues of tax planni ng, o r manipu lation, ex ist.2 8 T he unavo idab le conc lus ion
is that it is simp ly not poss ible to subject S corporat ion s
to a patte rn of taxatio n t hat does not ref lect the ex ist i ng
Code if it is to be made ava il ab le to taxpayers whose
othe r f in anc ial affa irs are fash ioned by the requ irements
of the Code. In fact, if Congress focused upon spec ific
potentia l abuses of Subc hapter S rat her t han upon overb road p rohi bitions, those abuses could be more effective ly curta il ed .

C. Towards a Solution
Many of t he f laws in Subchapter S considered above
could be eli m inated through further d iscrete techn ica l
amendments as has occurred repe ated ly in th e past. A
mid-year elect ion proced ure, for examp le, wou ld be qu ite
simple to enact. H istory suggests, howeve r, that a se ri es
of ad hoc amen d men ts is not t he path to rat iona lity.
Moreover, g iven the present conservat ive ap proach to t he
definit iona l provisions of Su bc hapter S, even simp le
prov isions tend to produce anci ll ary comp lexity . T h us, it
was suggested above that mid-year elect ions shou ld not
be all owed to C corporat ions un less the elect ion remained
in effect for a prescribed pe ri od-a ru le to w h ich the
usua l comp li cat ing exceptions wo uld undoubted ly be
necessary. Plain ly, broader based reform would be
desirab le.
When Subchapter S was or iginall y enacted in 1958 it
was regarded w ith understandable suspicion by both t he
Congress that enacted it and the Treasury Depart ment
that admi ni stered it. At the time, the eli m inat ion of the
co rpo rate leve l tax was a rad ica l step. Wha t was undoubted ly viewed as a substant ial subs idy to sma ll bus inesstoday we wou ld ca ll it a preference-was to be kept
tight ly cont ro ll ed . According ly, when Congress became
concerned th at the new condu it ent ity might be abused, it
adopted the most rest ri ctive so lutions.
After a qua rter of a cent u ry, Subchapter S is no longer
regarded as a pernic ious in f luence upon an otherw ise
rat iona l Code; many wou ld argue that the sing le level of
tax it produces is supe ri or in princ ip le to the taxat ion of
none lect in g co rporat ions. Moreover, it has now become
c lea r that the restrictive origina l so lut io ns to feared abuse
were both unn ecessary to the protectio n of Subchapter S
and harmfu l to the leg it imate use of S corporat ions. To
date, the congress ional response to th is cha nging percept ion of the S corporat ion has been both too limited
and inapprop ri ate ly designed. The gra nt of remed ial
rulin g authority in lim ited areas is not a sound substitute
for the development of reasonab le p rov isio ns. Rather, an
exp lorat ion of the least restrict ive alternat ives compat ib le
w ith t he object ives of Subchapter S is long overdue .
An S corporat ion cou ld be made as f lex ible and use fu l
a ve h ic le for investmen t as is a pa rt nersh ip. If regular
corporat ions, S corporat ions, trusts , and other partnersh ips may own interests in partnersh ips and partn erships
can own inte rests in regu lar corporat ions, trusts, and

2· 0ther exa mp les ex ist . Wh ile a part nership may not own an
inte res t i n an S co rporation, an S corporation may own an in terest i n a partners hi p, thu s creat i ng th e potenti al fo r tiered conduit
entit ies. Rece nt leg islation has addressed po ss ible abuses by
tiered partnersh ips, but tho se restr ict ions do not app ly if th e
parent ent ity is an S co rporation. See I. R.C. sectio n 706(d)(3) .
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other partnerships, there is no inherent reason why a
partnership-or a trust or a corporatio n-ca nnot own an
interest in an S corporation. There is, however, one
specific reason why S corporations conti nue to be regarded with a suspicion that has caused the Congress to
treat them differently from other conduit entities.
The one characteristic of the income of an S corpora tion that d istinguishes it from other sources of income is
that it may be attr ibutable to the cont inued investment of
ea rnings and profits de rived by the corporation in non electing years. One of the most striking features of
Subchapter S is th e extreme ease of entry and exit from
its prov isions. Wi th only the most trivial of exceptions, 29
there is no tax cost to either elect ing under Subchapter S
or revoking that election . In pr inciple, inco me accumulated during non elect ing years remains subj ect to the
same overall rate of tax as would have been imposed in
the absence of an elect ion because even di stributions by
an S corporation out of ea rning s and profits are subj ect
to a seco nd, shareholder level tax upon distribution .3o
Howeve r, a Subchapter S election permits the incom e
generated by the investment and reinvest ment of those
earn in gs to escape double taxation before those ea rnin g s
and profits have been taxed at the shareholder leve l. Th e
ge ne ral effect of this aspect of Subc hapter S is the same
as permitt ing t he pre-election ea rnings and profits to be
removed from co rporate so lution without the impositi o n
of tax.

An S corporation could be made as flexible
and useful a vehicle for investment as is a
partnership.

This highly favorabl e treatm ent of S e lections by C
corporations most clearly appears when contrasted with
the burd en of tax th at would be imposed had the corporation chosen instead to form the other conduit business
entity, a partnership . Upon the liquidation of the C
corporation, so me ta x would be imposed at the corporate
leve l. 31 More signif icant ly, the shareho lders would either
be subject to tax at capital gain s rates on the full va l ue of
the corporation under section 331 or an amount equal to
the e ntire earnings and profits of the corporation would
be subject to tax at ordinary rates under section 333. In
the former event the shareho lders receive a bas is in the
assets distributed equal to their fa ir market value; in the
latter case the basis for the assets is substituted from the
basis in the stock of the liquidated corporation .
Neither tax is imposed upon the making of an S
election. Rather, the general effect of the election is
similar to a section 333 liquidation w ith the tax on the
corporate earnings deferred , perhaps indef in ite ly .

' 9E.g ., under I.R .C. section 1373(b), the making or terminating
of an election is treate d as a di sposition for the purpose of
recaptur ing foreign losses under I.R.C. section 904 .
l °I. R.C. section 1368(c)(2).
31 Deprec iation recapture under I. R.C. sections 1245 and 1250
overrides th e general rule of I.R.C. section 336, as does the tax
benefit ru le and related doctrines . See Hillsboro Nationa l Bank
v. Commissioner, 460 U .S. 370 (1983).
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Similarly, the termination of the S election does not
involve in co me tax consequences. Whi le the in corpo rat ion of a partnership must pass through the safeguards of
sect ions 351 and 357, no such prov isions apply to t he
termination of the e lectio n . Thus, for examp le, the termination of an S e lection does not resu lt in a tax li ability
notwith standing that the liabi lities of the corporation
exceed the basis of its assets (because losses have been
passed through to the shareholders) while that excess
would be subject to immediate tax upon the incorporation
of a partne rship n

The propriety of this freedom to move in and
out of Subchapter S is highly questionable.

Th e propriety of this free dom to move in and out of
S ub chapter S is highly questionable in principle and has
opened major ave nu es of abuse in practice. Those possibilities, in turn, have precipitated the enactment of several
provisions in Subchapter S that are designed to prevent
th e ab use of Subchapter S by corporations. 33 And, of
present concern, th e potential presence of earnings and
profits in an S corporation has caused Congress to restri ct the availability of Subc hapter S through narrow and
technical definitional requirements.
Congress has been willing to pay this price in sacrifice
of principle and enhanced complexity becaU ~-; 9 it wanted
to m ake S corporation statu s freely avai lable to previous ly
incorporated busin esses . While that desire may have
been se nsible in 1958, it may not be sBnsi ble today. Few
corporations formed prior to 1958 wish to elect under
Subchapter S today and those formed after that date had
th eir opportun ity to select the form in which they desired
to do busin ess . Th is ease of transformation may no
long e r be essential to Subchapter S.
A st rong argument therefore exists that a corporation
having earnings and profits accumulated during none lecting years should not be permitted to elect under
Subchapter S unti l those ea rnings and profits were purged
through th e payment of an appropriate shareholder leve l
tax. However, it is ent ire ly possible to preserve this
generous feature of Subchapter S whi le simplifying its
provisions for most taxpayers.
The ex isting statutory framework already contains the
seeds of two versions of Subchapter S. Special sect ions
of the subchapter impose a tax upon capita l gains and
investment income derived by an S corporation that
prev ious ly was a C corporation. The rules govern ing
corporate distributions apply differently depending upon
whether the corporation has earnings and profits. And
the regulatory treatment of the two-class-of-stock safe

3' I. R.C. sec tion 357(c) .
331ncluding the corporate leve l tax on certa in cap ita l gains
imposed by I. R.C . section 1374, the tax and invo luntary term ination rules triggered by passive income under I.R .C . sections
1362(d)(3) and 1375, and the need for consent to elect with in five
years of a termination required by I.R .C. section 1362(g) .
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ha rbo r34 may we ll differ depe nd ing upon whet her the
corporat ion has earnings and pro fi ts .
T hat dichotomous treatment of S co rporat ions shou ld
be expanded to the pO int of creat ing two ent ire ly d istinct
versions of Subchapter S. T he ex ist ing provisions si mp ly
attempt too much; neither corporat ions having or lack ing
ea rn ings and prof its are def ined or taxed opt ima ll y. For S
co rporat ions hav ing earnings and prof its, the ru les of
current law are a lready too generous; two vers ions of
Subchapter S wou ld permit those rules to become more
rest rictive. But of greater present importance, el imi nating
the de ferra l of tax on earnings and prof its cou ld permit
the deve lopment of a tru ly viable S corporation.
Dur in g the 1982 rev ision, Professor G insburg argued in
these pages 35 for a s im il ar approach as a vehic le for
rationa liz i ng and simp lifying th e substantive provisions.
of Subchapter S. Assum i ng that it wou ld be unw ise or
unacceptab le to impo se a substant ial tax burden on all
corporations having aCGumu lated earnings and profits
that wished to e lect under Subchapter S, he suggested
that a simplifi ed version of S corporat ion be made ava ilab le to corporat ions that lack ed earn ings and prof its or
elected the imposit ion of an appropriate to ll charge as
t he price of the election. To h is observations it may be
added that a dua l Subchapter S may a lso be the on ly way
to achieve material procedural simplif icat ion of those
provis ions . In common w ith the substant ive taxing prov isions he addressed, many of the re strict ive def initiona l
and procedura l aspects of present law are attributable to
the ease of s hift ing betwee n Subchapters C and S by
corporations hav ing ea rnings and profits. A bsent that
aspect of S corporations, where would be no j ustificat ion
for treating an S corporat ion more restr ict ively than other
condu it entit ies .36
Careful co nsiderat ion, then, should be g iven to the
c reat ion of a category of S corporation that d id not have,
and cou ld not obta in, earn ings a nd profits attributab le to
none lecting years . If this s implified S corporat ion were
permitted to have co rpor ate shareho lders, as it should
be, it might also be necessary to bar the S corporat ion
from obtaining property from a none lecting co rporation
in a carryove r basis transact ion. Th e definit iona l and
procedura l requirements for s uch an S corporation cou ld
be re laxe d grea t ly. The number and catego ri es of permissible sharehO ld e rs cou ld be co nformed to the un limited
f lexibil ity granted to partnerships. As a result, the end less
ref i ne m en ts o f the definitional pro vis ion s now evolving in
the private ruling s wo u ld become unnecessary . The prohibition against whol ly owned s ubsidi ar ies could be re pealed. Th ese changes, in t urn, virt ually would e liminate
the problem of involuntary ter min at ion s of Select ions.
Other aspects of present law , such as the timing of
elections and the one c lass of stock req uireme nt, cou ld
be lib era lized. A nd , of course , the substant ive si mp lifi cat ion s noted by Professor Ginsburg cou ld be extended to
such a corporation.

'·'I.R.C . se ct io n 1361 (c)(5) bars treating ce rtain debt instru ments as stock. Thu s, this saf e harbor debt cannot be t rea ted as
a seco nd clas s of stock which wou ld t erm inate the Se lect ion .
3' G in sburg, Subchapter S an d Accumu lated E&P: A Different
View , Tax Notes , November 22, 1982, p. 57 1.
3· Perhap s ne ither S c orporat ion s no r partnerships sho uld b e
ent itled to so me of the more flex ib le features of S ubc hapte r K.
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An ex ist ing C corporation hav ing earn ings and prof its
could obtain the benefits of th is simp lif ied category of S
corporation o nl y by elect ing to subj ect its shareho lders
to a tax li ab ili ty that wou ld purge those earn ings and
profits . Op in ions may differ on the proper level of that tax
li abil ity. 37 Professor Ginsburg suggested that each shareholder be taxed on an amount equal to the excess of h is
share of the ins ide bas is for the corporate assets over the
bas is for h is stock and that t he tax be imposed at cap ita l
ga ins rates. Such a tax wou ld approximate a tax li m ited to
the earn ings and profits of the corporation (as under
sect ion 333) but imposed at the preferentia l rate (as
under section 331) and thus wou ld be far more favorab le
than is the ta x imposed at the shareholder leve l upon an
actual li quidation . If the to ll cha rge was not to be imposed
with respect to the entire va lue of the stock in the elect ing
corporat ion, it wou ld be more consistent w ith the ex ist in g
pattern of tax ing li quidat ions and other corporate d istributions to impose the tax at ordinary income rat es .
Corporat ions having earnings and prof its but not electing to become sub ject to whatever tax we re ultimate ly
determ ined appropriate wou ld, of course, remain subject
to the more restr ict ive procedural and substantive ru les
of present law . In fact, g iven an alternat ive S corporation
format, som e of the accommodations of present law
properly m ight be eli minated. Th e complex it ies of the
qua lified Subchapter S trust and of safe harbor debt
might be repea led and th e proh ib it ions against "o ne
shot" elections strengthened.
Such a dua l approach to Subchapter S m ight f inally
perm it th e evo lution of a w ide ly availab le conduit corpo rate entity free of both the procedura l and substantive
restr ict ions that have cr ipp led its predecessors.

"Compare Braubach, Wi ll the Subchapte r S Revision Act
Adequately Add ress the Issues of Accumu lated E&P and Passive
Inc o me?, Tax Notes, October 4,1982, p. 3.
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